




Taiwan is a province of China. This is a principle agreed
to by the Guomindang authorities in Taibei, by the government
of the People’s Republic of China, and more recently by the
United States. Yet any discussion of the &dquo;Taiwan question&dquo; and
its resolution should recognize that the divergent paths toward
economic development and the variations in social institutions
and values emerging over the past three decades make Taiwan
very different from the other provinces of China. Indeed, if
one is intent upon offering comparisons, Taiwan might be
usefully compared to Hong Kong, or better yet, South Korea.
It resembles both of these in providing competitively inexpensive
labor for export industries heavily underwritten by foreign
capital. Like both, it reflects changes wrought by the spread of
Western pop culture. Like South Korea, it owes its continued,
separate existence to the presence of American military forces
and military and economic aid; it owes its &dquo;stability&dquo; to American
backing of a dictatorial, repressive government that allows no
dissent and coopts its intellectuals with the promise of study
and employment in America as the reward for conformity and
support of the status quo.
Taiwan’s separate course was set even before 1949; in the
previous half-century as a Japanese colony (another experience
shared with Korea) Taiwan modernized sufficiently to advance
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beyond the rest of China in scientific agriculture, industrial
development, public health, education, transport, and com-
munications. Some historians would take the &dquo;split&dquo; even
further back in time, pointing to the late settlement of Taiwan
as a frontier area with abundant land, chances for upward
mobility, and the relative lack of control from Beijing during
the nineteenth century.
Despite all this, Taiwan remains undeniably Chinese in many
ways. The language, the foods, the festivals, religious practices,
family forms and associated role behaviors, and many of the
values by which people try to organize their everyday lives
are all part of the cultural heritage brought from southeastern
China, particularly from the Zhangzhou and Quanzhou districts
of Fujian. These elements, aside from their intrinsic meanings
and functions, served as ethnic markers to distinguish Han
settlers from the mountain aborigines, Chinese from their
Japanese overlords, and most recently Taiwanese from Main-
landers. Over the past two decades, anthropologists have found
. Taiwan’s villages, small towns, and older urban neighborhoods
to be a mine of information about the practices and beliefs
of an older, more traditional society. Despite industrialization,
urbanization, and depopulation of the countryside in recent
years, some cultural features, particularly in the area of religion,
have persisted and flourished.
In other ways, Taiwan has become Westernized. The first
exposure came via the modern education system instituted by
the Japanese and related colonial policies. The second group of
carriers of Westernization were the Guomindang supporters
arriving in the late 1940s, many of them shaped by life in Shanghai
and other treaty ports. They brought with them the emergent
lifestyle of the comprador and new bureaucratic-capitalist
class, heavily influenced by exposure to Euro-American mis-
sionaries, teachers, and businessmen. Some found Taiwan
quaint, but most thought it old-fashioned (in dress, diet, housing,
recreation, social relations, business organizations), super-
stitious (in the persistence of folk Buddhism, Taoism, and
lineage-connected ceremonials), backward, and boring. It did not
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take them long to transform Taibei into a reasonable facsimile
of Shanghai, and, as members of the ruling group, to persuade
some Taiwanese to emulate them. The American connection
accelerated and facilitated the process of acculturation. The
presence of a variety of foreigners, the diplomatic corps, thou-
sands of U.S. military personnel and their dependents, hundreds
of missionary families (once spread all over China but now
concentrated on this one small province), businessmen, repre-
sentatives of AID, USIS, JCRR, and a host of other acronyms,
plus teachers, researchers, and language students provided the
living, breathing, walking models for emulation, not only for
their formal counterparts and elite urban clientele but eventually
for the society at large. Thousands of students went to American
universities each year, bringing back the latest in fashion, pop
music and modern ways while the television channels and the
movie houses, dominated by American productions, relayed the
message to those who never left home.
Hence, the articles in this journal will not shed much light
on developments in China over the past few decades. If anything,
they underscore the differences between Taiwan and the rest of
China, and the potential difficulties that will come with re-
unification. They may be of more value in examining Third
World development outside of the socialist sphere or as a warning
of what all of China might have become had the Guomindang
been able to retain power. The articles explore Taiwan itself,
in the contemporary world. Despite the differences in approach,
the articles are linked together by some common concerns,
namely changes in social stratification, examination of social
classes, and the social and political advantages and costs of
Taiwan’s road toward modernization and development.
The articles by anthropologists DeGlopper, Diamond, and
Gates are a breakaway from the usual concerns of that discipline
as it has been operating in the China field. For a change, we are
not talking about lineage organization, religious cults, or the
implications of adopted sister marriages. The article by Donald
DeGlopper most closely approaches the interests of traditional
anthropologists; the recruitment, living patterns, values, and
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relations within an artisan class that has thus far resisted prole-
tarianization. He reminds us that a substantial proportion of
production and commerce is still carried out in small scale
units, in a milieu where relationships are personalized and the
reputation of a shop and its individual craftsmen still counts.
Yet it is clear that these craftsmen are not simply &dquo;survivals&dquo;
from a more pleasant precapitalist era. Their numbers have been
sustained and increased by the prosperity of the export boom
which, for the time being, gives them an expanded clientele.
My own article deals with a segment of the new working class,
the adolescent female factory workers. Foreign investors have
been drawn to Taiwan by the promise of cheap labor; in the
special Export Zones they operate tax-free, and bring in their
equipment duty-free. Taiwan’s beleaguered local entrepreneurs
pay heavy taxes and outrageous import duties on equipment
and material and struggle to gain advantage in the overseas
market by keeping the cost of labor as low as possible. Whereas
DeGlopper’s carpenter-artisans work with joy and committment,
work in the factories is temporary, transitory, and alienating.
The artisans take pride in what they are and what they do. The
factory women find little reward in their wages or their work;
they comfort themselves with the social gratifications of the
workplace and the knowledge that they are helping their families.
They fantasize escape through marriage into the new middle
class, denying or rejecting their peasant and petit-bourgeois
origins and the realities of their proletarian status.
Gates’ article sheds light on the confusion of class identity
by examining the complexities of social stratification and social
mobility in Taiwan and by pointing out the relationship between
the peasant petit-bourgeois sector and the industrial work
force. She argues that many of the young workers in Taiwan’s
new industries are drawn from a reserve labor pool, and after
a few years in the factories return for permanent employment to
the family farms and small family businesses. The emergence
of a class-conscious proletariat is thus aborted.
Her article also highlights the intersection of social class
and ethnicity: the ways in which the Taiwanese-Mainlander
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distinction affects opportunity, mobility, and class relation-
ships. No matter that in the final analysis the Taiwanese are
culturally Chinese, the ethnic distinction that exists in the minds
of many, and which is reflected in the social order, must be
accorded reality. Ethnicity too blurs class perception. Although
members of both ethnic blocs are present in almost all social
classes, there is a correlation between ethnicity and the source
and degree of ones wealth and power. Workers, peasants, and
soldiers (excepting the retired remnants of the original Guomin-
dang army) are almost exclusively Taiwanese, as are ’those in
the small business sector. Top government officials, civil service
employees, military officers, controllers of the media, and
managers of state-owned enterprises are almost exclusively
Mainlanders. Intellectuals, professionals, and technicians are
drawn from both groups, though Mainlanders seem to be over-
represented given their number in the general population.
The ethnic differences, usually denied by the Guomindang
authorities, are sometimes made use of by Mainlander elites
to further confuse the issue. In an ironic inversion of social
reality, the handful of Taiwanese entrepreneurs whose wealth
gives them undeniable claim to upper-class status are pointed
to as evidence that the Taiwanese dominate business and
monopolize the wealth. The Taiwanese shopkeeper families, who
live and work in cramped storefronts and whose children move
in and out of low-paid factory jobs as necessity dictates are
officially registered as &dquo;businessmen&dquo; and encouraged to think
of themselves as middle class. Meantime, the Guomindang
ex-generals and the treaty-port compradores who followed
them to Taiwan, run the banks, the state monopolies, and
corporations, and modestly describe themselves as salaried
civil servants and dispossessed refugees.
While Gates’ article discusses distortions of development,
Amsden’s focus is on Taiwan’s &dquo;economic miracle,&dquo; i.e., the
rapid growth rate of the economy. Her article points to the
role played by the State, by which she means not just the Guomin-
dang but also the Japanese colonial rule. She reminds us that
Taiwan’s &dquo;green revolution&dquo; predates the arrival of the Guomin-
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dang, as does the growth of local industry and the modern infra-
structure. She reminds us also of the role of the United States
as a patron, pushing for a moderate land reform program to
appease the peasantry, funneling in aid monies and advisors,
footing the military bills, and helping to keep unemployment
at the minimum.
Although her data lead her to different conclusions, Amsden’s
discussion of cartels, publib corporations, and other manifesta-
tions of bureaucratic capitalism strengthen Gates’ analysis of
the power structure and the loci of control over banking, heavy
industry, transport, communication, and the marketing of cash
crops. And although she is positive in her evaluation of the
impact of foreign investment and trade and the role played by
the State in economic development, she makes it clear that the
circumstances are such as to make Taiwan a &dquo;special case&dquo;
rather than a model for development for the rest of the Third
World. 
’
Moreover, her conclusions point to contradictions within the
system, which may lead to new polarizations in the years ahead.
Taiwan, until recently, has been an example of a happy marriage
between State capitalism and neocolonialism. In the past year
or two, there have been stirrings of discontent. With normalized
relations between the United States and China in the offing,
new political coalitions have emerged in challenge to the Guomin-
dang monopoly of power, and to its claim to be the government
of all China. The preemptive cancellation of elections in Decem-
ber 1978, the harrassment and jailing of oppositionist candidates
(both Taiwanese and Mainlander), the strengthening of martial
law, the closure or buying out of oppositionist or non-Guomin-
dang newspapers and magazines, and the recent increase in
political arrests are indicators of the internal shakiness of the
system and panic by the Guomindang authorities that they may
not last long enough to be the one to negotiate the inevitable
reunification. For all their stridant attacks on communism,
the present ruling elites know that they have more to fear (and
more to lose) at the hands of a broad-based coalition of Tai-
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wanese peasantry, working class, and middle class, joined by
some of their own disillusioned sons and daughters. For the
time being, the Guomindang seems to have sold its self-image
to Beijing: they present themselves as patriotic Chinese who
fought against the Japanese and are now struggling against
bourgeois nationalists who, aided by certain Japanese and
American interests, seek to sever Taiwan from the motherland.
In their propaganda aimed at representatives of the People’s
Republic of China they present all the anti-Guomindang opposi-
tion as supporters of Taiwan independence. Many of Taiwan’s
people look forward to the day when Beijing recognizes what the
anti-Guomindang opposition groups are really saying, lays to
rest the myth of continuing Guomindang &dquo;Patriotism,&dquo; and
negotiates the reunification of the province with those who
are truly representative of Taiwan’s people.
